My personal opinion is that the "race of logistics"/"war of attrition" was an outcome of Russia being unable to wrap everything up quickly like it initially wanted to do, not a planned feature of the SMO.
As for why the bridges still aren't being destroyed, I plan to have a piece about that tomorrow or the next day, definitely by the end of the week. I've been thinking about it a lot and want to generate a discussion.
Absolutely, I was relieved to see that Russia -- which traditionally lacks flexibility and takes a long time to learn lessons -- adapted to changing circumstances a lot faster than I thought.
It could have been faster in hindsight, of course, but it was still better than what I think many expected. Everything's back on the right track though earlier opportunities that could have been tapped now appear forever lost.
The conflict is altogether different at this point than it was at the beginning. Whereas it might have been easier to destroy the bridges back then, now it's much harder and there might be less missiles comfortably available to expend.
After all, Ukraine has around 20 bridges over the Dnieper, and there's certainly some air defense guarding at least the main ones. I'm not so sure Russia has the excess missiles required for saturating 20 bridges simultaneously.
Yes, that's certainly true in one sense, on the surface, which tends to be about as far as most issues ever penetrate. In another sense, though, regarding matters of military necessity, when the gloves really come off, they seem flexible enough to scorch land and adaptable enough to rise afresh from the ashes. I think this is what the aggressors missed, or got wrong, in 1990-92, when they were deciding whether to expand NATO for 'full spectrum dominance', or work to find out how they could help and learn from the collapse of the USSR. Jeffery Sachs sheds some revealing light on this. (https://www.unz.com/article/how-the-neocons-chose-hegemony-over-peace-beginning-in-the-early-1990s/?utm_source=email&utm_campaign=daily)
I think this is because their wars, when the military needs to take its gloves off, are defensive тАФ their necessity is existential. I shall refrain from commenting on aggressors' wars.
"I'm not so sure Russia has the excess missiles required for saturating 20 bridges simultaneously."
There is, of course, the solution NATO would employ, the same as they used at Kakhova: blow up just one dam to make a flood of biblical proportion. I shan't comment on morality or military ethics here. I wonder how many bridges are downstream of the dam at the top of the Dnepr? There's a difference between scorching your own and someone else's land.
This is perhaps the most reliable indication of how the Russians REALLY regard the Ukraine as a viable state тАФ what is theirs and what is the Ukraine's тАФ and their respect for Ukrainian sovereignty: they won't scorch the Ukrainians' earth because it's not theirs to scorch (or flood). I shan't comment on the Americans' regard for whatever the hell was downstream of Kakhovka.
Agreed. The тАЬKiev GambitтАЭ was a chance to prevent all of this plus тАФ as many also conveniently forget тАФ a very successful тАЬpinningтАЭ of AFU forces that allowed them to clean house in Azovstal.
You're right, I wrote about it at the time at the now-defunct oneworld.press (you can find an Internet Archive version of my work there from February 2022-September 2022 when I fully moved to Substack once they closed down).
Basically, I still believe that it was a feint to divide Kiev's forces from the southern and eastern fronts so as to facilitate more advances there with a view towards building the "land bridge" (which was successful) while pressuring Zelensky to capitulate (which was unsuccessful).
Excellent points!
I do believe you, like Putin and the Russians, are quite right.
My personal opinion is that the "race of logistics"/"war of attrition" was an outcome of Russia being unable to wrap everything up quickly like it initially wanted to do, not a planned feature of the SMO.
As for why the bridges still aren't being destroyed, I plan to have a piece about that tomorrow or the next day, definitely by the end of the week. I've been thinking about it a lot and want to generate a discussion.
"...not a planned feature of the SMO."
No, it would be difficult to ignore that aspect of the SMO has not gone to plan.
Still, flexibility and adaptability being what they are, as important as they are, perhaps it's not such a bad thing (in the long run)?
"...the bridges still aren't being destroyed, I plan to have a piece about that..."
Ah-ha, I look forward to that.
Thanks for the heads-up!
Absolutely, I was relieved to see that Russia -- which traditionally lacks flexibility and takes a long time to learn lessons -- adapted to changing circumstances a lot faster than I thought.
It could have been faster in hindsight, of course, but it was still better than what I think many expected. Everything's back on the right track though earlier opportunities that could have been tapped now appear forever lost.
The conflict is altogether different at this point than it was at the beginning. Whereas it might have been easier to destroy the bridges back then, now it's much harder and there might be less missiles comfortably available to expend.
After all, Ukraine has around 20 bridges over the Dnieper, and there's certainly some air defense guarding at least the main ones. I'm not so sure Russia has the excess missiles required for saturating 20 bridges simultaneously.
"...traditionally lacks flexibility..."
Yes, that's certainly true in one sense, on the surface, which tends to be about as far as most issues ever penetrate. In another sense, though, regarding matters of military necessity, when the gloves really come off, they seem flexible enough to scorch land and adaptable enough to rise afresh from the ashes. I think this is what the aggressors missed, or got wrong, in 1990-92, when they were deciding whether to expand NATO for 'full spectrum dominance', or work to find out how they could help and learn from the collapse of the USSR. Jeffery Sachs sheds some revealing light on this. (https://www.unz.com/article/how-the-neocons-chose-hegemony-over-peace-beginning-in-the-early-1990s/?utm_source=email&utm_campaign=daily)
I think this is because their wars, when the military needs to take its gloves off, are defensive тАФ their necessity is existential. I shall refrain from commenting on aggressors' wars.
"I'm not so sure Russia has the excess missiles required for saturating 20 bridges simultaneously."
There is, of course, the solution NATO would employ, the same as they used at Kakhova: blow up just one dam to make a flood of biblical proportion. I shan't comment on morality or military ethics here. I wonder how many bridges are downstream of the dam at the top of the Dnepr? There's a difference between scorching your own and someone else's land.
This is perhaps the most reliable indication of how the Russians REALLY regard the Ukraine as a viable state тАФ what is theirs and what is the Ukraine's тАФ and their respect for Ukrainian sovereignty: they won't scorch the Ukrainians' earth because it's not theirs to scorch (or flood). I shan't comment on the Americans' regard for whatever the hell was downstream of Kakhovka.
Agreed. The тАЬKiev GambitтАЭ was a chance to prevent all of this plus тАФ as many also conveniently forget тАФ a very successful тАЬpinningтАЭ of AFU forces that allowed them to clean house in Azovstal.
You're right, I wrote about it at the time at the now-defunct oneworld.press (you can find an Internet Archive version of my work there from February 2022-September 2022 when I fully moved to Substack once they closed down).
Basically, I still believe that it was a feint to divide Kiev's forces from the southern and eastern fronts so as to facilitate more advances there with a view towards building the "land bridge" (which was successful) while pressuring Zelensky to capitulate (which was unsuccessful).