That's not what's happening. The explicitly stated objective of the SMO was to push threats as far away from Russia's border as possible not keep or bait them as close as possible, including at the further risk of civilian lives.
What you're apparently doing is trying to rationalize the sluggish pace of this conflict like a lot of top inf…
That's not what's happening. The explicitly stated objective of the SMO was to push threats as far away from Russia's border as possible not keep or bait them as close as possible, including at the further risk of civilian lives.
What you're apparently doing is trying to rationalize the sluggish pace of this conflict like a lot of top influencers have done, but the explanation doesn't align with the actual objectives.
Everything you've written is challenged by simply asking why Russia wouldn't advance to the river if it was able to and thus target these attacking units further away from its borders instead of close to them.
What you're implying, whether you intend to or not, is that Russia can indeed advance but chooses not to as part of some "master plan", even though this same "plan" has led to many civilians being killed inside Russia's pre-2014 borders.
"The explicitly stated objective of the SMO was to push threats as far away from Russia's border as possible not keep or bait them as close as possible, including at the further risk of civilian lives."
The original stated objective was demilitarization and de-nazification. Demilitarization consists of risking as few of your own guys as possible to deplete the enemy's numbers. The best way to do that is from a well prepared defensive position if you know your enemy will attack.
The alternative, which you seem to be suggesting, is to advance in force to the Dnieper, which while possible, would cost considerably more in Russian lives and equipment than what they're currently losing from Ukrainian artillery.
Neither of us knows what the Russian General Staff is planning, but if I had to guess, I'd say the basic idea was (until recently) to gradually degrade the UAF, while keeping the conflict in the east so as not to tempt a NATO occupation of western Ukraine. Better to deplete both UAF and NATO gradually than risk a sudden escalation by advancing in force.
The preferred outcome, which we're starting to see now, is collapse of the command structure and political infighting, which ideally would lead to a coup and some form of negotiations. Barring that (and I'm not giving odds) the objective would be to advance in force once the enemy is sufficiently depleted and the risks to your own guys are minimized. We're at or near that point I would say, which is why the bridges are still standing.
"What you're apparently doing is trying to rationalize the sluggish pace of this conflict like a lot of top influencers have done, but the explanation doesn't align with the actual objectives. "
What I'm doing is the same as what you're doing - using the best available sources and arriving at my own reasoned conclusions. I don't follow what you call 'top influencers' who I would characterize as impatience and lacking in actual military knowledge, so not worth paying attention to.
Demilitarization is facilitated by pushing threats as far away from the border as possible to the point where they no longer threaten, let alone harm and kill, Russians, which doesn't equate to letting them remain on the border.
Moreover, Ukrainian arms continue being replenished, although Russia is winning the "race of logistics" with NATO. Maintaining the status quo only incrementally achieves the aforementioned objective.
Russia is struggling to advance in Ukraine, but it's still trying. Your claims that it's sitting back letting the enemy strike don't align with the reality of gradual advances on the ground.
On the topic of collapsing the central command, Russia also continues eschewing attacks against command and control centers. They still to this day won't carry out large-scale targeted strikes against them.
Your understanding of everything is a reaction to the sluggish pace of this conflict, one which tries to present it as a master plan of sorts, when it's really just improvisation given serious limitations and continued self-restraint.
And that self-restraint is due to, in my view outdated and perhaps even to a degree misguided (in hindsight) factors whose influence over decisionmaking continues to linger.
Again, the most sensible thing to do is to take out those bridges, but that's not being done, and it's not because Russia wants to bait the enemy closer to its borders, but because of political calculations and some military limitations.
"Demilitarization is facilitated by pushing threats as far away from the border as possible..."
If you can. That's a very long border. To do what you suggest would require a major assembly of forces which would be vulnerable to attack. Don't forget, the line of contact was already well established before Russia entered the fight. That meant you'd be attacking fortified positions where a 3 to 1 advantage would be needed to guarantee success. Over that amount of terrain, I agree, Russia would be stretched to achieve that goal, which would be what? To capture mostly empty fields? Look at the map. It's all farmland with very little cover. Once you've advanced and captured that you then have to hold it, which requires building fortifications. It also stretches your supply lines. Why would you do that when the enemy keeps coming at your already well fortified lines, which were established years before entering the fray? That's been the plan these last 2 years and it is militarily sound, even if it doesn't satisfy the demands of people with no understanding of peer level conflict in this kind of theatre. Seems to me you're falling into the same trap as the pundits you decry. Why is it taking so long? Must be something amiss. No, it's just that in war you don't make rash decisions that costs unnecessary lives and equipment. You let the enemy do that, and thus far they've cooperated.
"Moreover, Ukrainian arms continue being replenished,..."
Sure, the part that isn't diverted to the black market. A friend of mine who fought on the Ukrainian side tells a different story. Ammunition and artillery rounds were in short supply as were other essentials. He even spent his own money to buy a van so his supposedly mobile infantry unit could get around because they didn't supply them with a vehicle. That's how bad it was on his section of the line, and that was six months ago. His description comports with that given by many captured UAF soldiers, so I'm inclined to take his word.
"Russia is struggling to advance in Ukraine, but it's still trying. Your claims that it's sitting back letting the enemy strike don't align with the reality of gradual advances on the ground."
The strategy has shifted now that the UAF is sufficiently depleted in most areas. They actually helped in that regard by diverting resources to Kirsk. I maintain, and this is from Russian sources not armchair enthusiasts, that the strategy these last two years was to minimize losses while inflicting maximum damage, and that goal has now been largely achieved, which is why you're seeing an advance now, rather than 6 months or a year ago. Time has been on Russia's side since day one, so why would you commit to a strategy that depletes your own forces when you don't have to? Up until now it has not been about capturing territory, which as I've pointed out incurs unacceptable losses, stretches supply lines and requires new fortifications. Simpler to just sit tight and let the enemy (who has no chance of overrunning you) throw himself into a meat grinder.
"On the topic of collapsing the central command, Russia also continues eschewing attacks against command and control centers. They still to this day won't carry out large-scale targeted strikes against them."
Where are you getting this from? They just hit a major concentration of NATO and UAF personnel and there have been similar attacks on command and control centres previously. You make it sound easy, but I would point out that some of these command centres date to Soviet times and are built to withstand a nuclear attack. I would also point out that you don't target a position where you have your own people on the inside supplying vital information. This would apply to the SBU as well as the military.
"Your understanding of everything is a reaction to the sluggish pace of this conflict,"
Up to this point I've tried to avoid characterizing your position as you've done to mine several times now, but this is becoming a polemic and I try to avoid those. You clearly have strong opinions on the subject, but unless you have a direct line to the Russian General Staff, you're basically in the same boat as I am. As for the bridges, those will be needed in the coming advance across the Dneiper, which will involve capturing both banks plus several kms to the west as well. The ultimate goal is Odessa which can't be approached from Kherson due to interceding rivers. That's my prediction at least, based on the historic importance of Odessa as a Russian city, plus the need to control the entire littoral to prevent attacks by sea.
Time will tell whose analysis is more grounded. In the meantime, I'll let you have the last word as I see no point in arguing any further about it.
1. Russia was the one that advanced into Ukraine, precisely to push back threats to their border. The early stages of the SMO saw rapid progress but it wasn’t sustained by defendable supply chains and therefore led to similarly large-scale tactical pullbacks.
It’s sufficient to pull up maps shared by Russian media from that time to show how far and fast they initially went. This wouldn’t have happened, with all the associated losses afterwards, if the goal was just to sit back, shoot at nearby threats across the border, and wage some protracted war of attrition.
2. You’re right, Russia was and is attacking well-fortified positions, hence the very slow pace of advance. Mariupol, Artyomovsk, and Avdeevka are the most well-known battles of this kind.
Your model doesn’t explain why such tremendous costs were paid when Russia could, according to you, have just sat back the whole time on the defensive and let its foes come to it instead.
3. Again, you’re right, there are lots of open fields where personnel are exposed, but haven’t you seen the videos from both sides showing each taking out the other there?
Russia isn’t sitting back and letting Ukraine come to it, it’s taking the battle to Ukraine. I don’t know if you’re gaslighting or really never saw such footage. I have no idea how else to react to that point.
4. What you claim was the plan for the last two years actually hasn’t been the plan: again, Russia continues trying to advance, but at high costs, and sometimes it suffers setbacks like in Kharkov and Kherson.
Both happened in 2022, this is undeniable, and they were retreats in the face of Ukraine exploiting overextended supply lines. Again, I don’t know whether you’re gaslight or really aren’t aware of this.
5. Actually, no, I don’t suspect that anything is “amiss”, and have always maintained that the prioritization of political and soft power goals over military ones is responsible for this:
Unlike you, I won’t spin every setback and challenge as “part of the plan” as you’re implying. I think that’s intellectually insulting this far down the line but acknowledge that it’s popular cope.
6. I’ve also closely covered the race of logistics/war of attrition and am therefore very well aware of it:
That said, Russia’s edge still hasn’t translated into huge gains, precisely because Ukraine keeps replenishing.
7. The strategy only started shifting this summer, but even now, gains are piecemeal due to the difficult nature of this conflict.
This wasn’t the “master plan”, it was an improvisation, and Russia still threw lots of troops and equipment at heavily defended Ukrainian positions this whole time.
8. I’m personally skeptical of official reports about thousands being killed each day, hundreds of NATO troops being taken out, etc.
We’ve seen that some official reports like those from the beginning of Kursk didn’t align with reality for whatever reason. The same may hold true of those too.
9. It’s pure speculation that Russia has moles deep inside Ukrainian C&C, which is unlikely considering how often they’re caught by surprise.
As for the structures themselves, there’s a finite number of legacy ones and Russia has bunker-busting bombs, but it still holds back.
10. I don’t take claims of Russia planning to cross the Dnieper in force seriously anymore. Ukraine can blow up the bridges if need be and NATO can intervene to secure Odessa, etc.
The fantasy of Russian troops on Ukraine’s borders with NATO countries isn’t going to pan out, but I know a lot of people “need” to believe in it, and I no longer try to disabuse them of that.
That's not what's happening. The explicitly stated objective of the SMO was to push threats as far away from Russia's border as possible not keep or bait them as close as possible, including at the further risk of civilian lives.
What you're apparently doing is trying to rationalize the sluggish pace of this conflict like a lot of top influencers have done, but the explanation doesn't align with the actual objectives.
Everything you've written is challenged by simply asking why Russia wouldn't advance to the river if it was able to and thus target these attacking units further away from its borders instead of close to them.
What you're implying, whether you intend to or not, is that Russia can indeed advance but chooses not to as part of some "master plan", even though this same "plan" has led to many civilians being killed inside Russia's pre-2014 borders.
"The explicitly stated objective of the SMO was to push threats as far away from Russia's border as possible not keep or bait them as close as possible, including at the further risk of civilian lives."
The original stated objective was demilitarization and de-nazification. Demilitarization consists of risking as few of your own guys as possible to deplete the enemy's numbers. The best way to do that is from a well prepared defensive position if you know your enemy will attack.
The alternative, which you seem to be suggesting, is to advance in force to the Dnieper, which while possible, would cost considerably more in Russian lives and equipment than what they're currently losing from Ukrainian artillery.
Neither of us knows what the Russian General Staff is planning, but if I had to guess, I'd say the basic idea was (until recently) to gradually degrade the UAF, while keeping the conflict in the east so as not to tempt a NATO occupation of western Ukraine. Better to deplete both UAF and NATO gradually than risk a sudden escalation by advancing in force.
The preferred outcome, which we're starting to see now, is collapse of the command structure and political infighting, which ideally would lead to a coup and some form of negotiations. Barring that (and I'm not giving odds) the objective would be to advance in force once the enemy is sufficiently depleted and the risks to your own guys are minimized. We're at or near that point I would say, which is why the bridges are still standing.
"What you're apparently doing is trying to rationalize the sluggish pace of this conflict like a lot of top influencers have done, but the explanation doesn't align with the actual objectives. "
What I'm doing is the same as what you're doing - using the best available sources and arriving at my own reasoned conclusions. I don't follow what you call 'top influencers' who I would characterize as impatience and lacking in actual military knowledge, so not worth paying attention to.
Demilitarization is facilitated by pushing threats as far away from the border as possible to the point where they no longer threaten, let alone harm and kill, Russians, which doesn't equate to letting them remain on the border.
Moreover, Ukrainian arms continue being replenished, although Russia is winning the "race of logistics" with NATO. Maintaining the status quo only incrementally achieves the aforementioned objective.
Russia is struggling to advance in Ukraine, but it's still trying. Your claims that it's sitting back letting the enemy strike don't align with the reality of gradual advances on the ground.
On the topic of collapsing the central command, Russia also continues eschewing attacks against command and control centers. They still to this day won't carry out large-scale targeted strikes against them.
Your understanding of everything is a reaction to the sluggish pace of this conflict, one which tries to present it as a master plan of sorts, when it's really just improvisation given serious limitations and continued self-restraint.
And that self-restraint is due to, in my view outdated and perhaps even to a degree misguided (in hindsight) factors whose influence over decisionmaking continues to linger.
Again, the most sensible thing to do is to take out those bridges, but that's not being done, and it's not because Russia wants to bait the enemy closer to its borders, but because of political calculations and some military limitations.
"Demilitarization is facilitated by pushing threats as far away from the border as possible..."
If you can. That's a very long border. To do what you suggest would require a major assembly of forces which would be vulnerable to attack. Don't forget, the line of contact was already well established before Russia entered the fight. That meant you'd be attacking fortified positions where a 3 to 1 advantage would be needed to guarantee success. Over that amount of terrain, I agree, Russia would be stretched to achieve that goal, which would be what? To capture mostly empty fields? Look at the map. It's all farmland with very little cover. Once you've advanced and captured that you then have to hold it, which requires building fortifications. It also stretches your supply lines. Why would you do that when the enemy keeps coming at your already well fortified lines, which were established years before entering the fray? That's been the plan these last 2 years and it is militarily sound, even if it doesn't satisfy the demands of people with no understanding of peer level conflict in this kind of theatre. Seems to me you're falling into the same trap as the pundits you decry. Why is it taking so long? Must be something amiss. No, it's just that in war you don't make rash decisions that costs unnecessary lives and equipment. You let the enemy do that, and thus far they've cooperated.
"Moreover, Ukrainian arms continue being replenished,..."
Sure, the part that isn't diverted to the black market. A friend of mine who fought on the Ukrainian side tells a different story. Ammunition and artillery rounds were in short supply as were other essentials. He even spent his own money to buy a van so his supposedly mobile infantry unit could get around because they didn't supply them with a vehicle. That's how bad it was on his section of the line, and that was six months ago. His description comports with that given by many captured UAF soldiers, so I'm inclined to take his word.
"Russia is struggling to advance in Ukraine, but it's still trying. Your claims that it's sitting back letting the enemy strike don't align with the reality of gradual advances on the ground."
The strategy has shifted now that the UAF is sufficiently depleted in most areas. They actually helped in that regard by diverting resources to Kirsk. I maintain, and this is from Russian sources not armchair enthusiasts, that the strategy these last two years was to minimize losses while inflicting maximum damage, and that goal has now been largely achieved, which is why you're seeing an advance now, rather than 6 months or a year ago. Time has been on Russia's side since day one, so why would you commit to a strategy that depletes your own forces when you don't have to? Up until now it has not been about capturing territory, which as I've pointed out incurs unacceptable losses, stretches supply lines and requires new fortifications. Simpler to just sit tight and let the enemy (who has no chance of overrunning you) throw himself into a meat grinder.
"On the topic of collapsing the central command, Russia also continues eschewing attacks against command and control centers. They still to this day won't carry out large-scale targeted strikes against them."
Where are you getting this from? They just hit a major concentration of NATO and UAF personnel and there have been similar attacks on command and control centres previously. You make it sound easy, but I would point out that some of these command centres date to Soviet times and are built to withstand a nuclear attack. I would also point out that you don't target a position where you have your own people on the inside supplying vital information. This would apply to the SBU as well as the military.
"Your understanding of everything is a reaction to the sluggish pace of this conflict,"
Up to this point I've tried to avoid characterizing your position as you've done to mine several times now, but this is becoming a polemic and I try to avoid those. You clearly have strong opinions on the subject, but unless you have a direct line to the Russian General Staff, you're basically in the same boat as I am. As for the bridges, those will be needed in the coming advance across the Dneiper, which will involve capturing both banks plus several kms to the west as well. The ultimate goal is Odessa which can't be approached from Kherson due to interceding rivers. That's my prediction at least, based on the historic importance of Odessa as a Russian city, plus the need to control the entire littoral to prevent attacks by sea.
Time will tell whose analysis is more grounded. In the meantime, I'll let you have the last word as I see no point in arguing any further about it.
1. Russia was the one that advanced into Ukraine, precisely to push back threats to their border. The early stages of the SMO saw rapid progress but it wasn’t sustained by defendable supply chains and therefore led to similarly large-scale tactical pullbacks.
It’s sufficient to pull up maps shared by Russian media from that time to show how far and fast they initially went. This wouldn’t have happened, with all the associated losses afterwards, if the goal was just to sit back, shoot at nearby threats across the border, and wage some protracted war of attrition.
2. You’re right, Russia was and is attacking well-fortified positions, hence the very slow pace of advance. Mariupol, Artyomovsk, and Avdeevka are the most well-known battles of this kind.
Your model doesn’t explain why such tremendous costs were paid when Russia could, according to you, have just sat back the whole time on the defensive and let its foes come to it instead.
3. Again, you’re right, there are lots of open fields where personnel are exposed, but haven’t you seen the videos from both sides showing each taking out the other there?
Russia isn’t sitting back and letting Ukraine come to it, it’s taking the battle to Ukraine. I don’t know if you’re gaslighting or really never saw such footage. I have no idea how else to react to that point.
4. What you claim was the plan for the last two years actually hasn’t been the plan: again, Russia continues trying to advance, but at high costs, and sometimes it suffers setbacks like in Kharkov and Kherson.
Both happened in 2022, this is undeniable, and they were retreats in the face of Ukraine exploiting overextended supply lines. Again, I don’t know whether you’re gaslight or really aren’t aware of this.
5. Actually, no, I don’t suspect that anything is “amiss”, and have always maintained that the prioritization of political and soft power goals over military ones is responsible for this:
https://korybko.substack.com/p/20-constructive-critiques-about-russias
Unlike you, I won’t spin every setback and challenge as “part of the plan” as you’re implying. I think that’s intellectually insulting this far down the line but acknowledge that it’s popular cope.
6. I’ve also closely covered the race of logistics/war of attrition and am therefore very well aware of it:
https://korybko.substack.com/p/natos-self-declared-race-of-logistics
https://korybko.substack.com/p/the-new-york-times-confirmed-that-774
That said, Russia’s edge still hasn’t translated into huge gains, precisely because Ukraine keeps replenishing.
7. The strategy only started shifting this summer, but even now, gains are piecemeal due to the difficult nature of this conflict.
This wasn’t the “master plan”, it was an improvisation, and Russia still threw lots of troops and equipment at heavily defended Ukrainian positions this whole time.
8. I’m personally skeptical of official reports about thousands being killed each day, hundreds of NATO troops being taken out, etc.
We’ve seen that some official reports like those from the beginning of Kursk didn’t align with reality for whatever reason. The same may hold true of those too.
9. It’s pure speculation that Russia has moles deep inside Ukrainian C&C, which is unlikely considering how often they’re caught by surprise.
As for the structures themselves, there’s a finite number of legacy ones and Russia has bunker-busting bombs, but it still holds back.
10. I don’t take claims of Russia planning to cross the Dnieper in force seriously anymore. Ukraine can blow up the bridges if need be and NATO can intervene to secure Odessa, etc.
The fantasy of Russian troops on Ukraine’s borders with NATO countries isn’t going to pan out, but I know a lot of people “need” to believe in it, and I no longer try to disabuse them of that.