The US’ Reportedly Canceled Tomahawk Deployment To Germany Isn’t That Big Of A Deal

Such a move wouldn’t substantively alleviate the newfound pressure upon Russia brought about by the tightening of the containment noose around it in the Arctic-Baltic, Central Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and Northeast Asia respectively led by the UK, Poland, Turkiye, and Japan.

Politico reported last week that “Pentagon likely to cancel missile sale to Germany over fears of Russia” but editorialized that “American officials, even if primarily fearful of Russia’s reaction, likely are also worried about the shrinking U.S. weapons stockpile.” It’s the depletion of US stockpiles during the Third Gulf War, not “fears of Russia”, that’s arguably the driving force behind this decision. After all, the most that Russia could do is deploy more missiles – including nukes – to Kaliningrad, Belarus, and/or Crimea.

Russia already has such strategic arms there, however, so the only thing that would change is the quantity. While it’s nevertheless a positive development from Russia’s perspective that the US reportedly plans to cancel its Tomahawk deployment to Germany, the last hyperlinked analysis in the paragraph above assessed that “even if the US hypothetically withdrew all its forces from [Central Europe] as part of a grand compromise with Russia, this wouldn’t fully alleviate Russia’s security concerns”.

That piece pointed to last November’s analysis about how “The Pentagon’s European Drawdown Won’t Alleviate Russia’s Security Concerns” because “The US is offloading most of the responsibilities for containing Russia onto Poland, the UK, France, and Germany”. In fact, it was recently observed that “The Brits, French, & Germans Are Now Right On Russia’s Doorstep”, which is all the more concerning due to Medvedev’s recent warning about the 1941-like threat posed by Germany’s remilitarization.

Be that as it may, and recalling the self-interested calculations that would likely be behind this canceled deployment if confirmed as regards the need to replenish the US’ depleted missile stockpile, such a move could conveniently facilitate the Kremlin’s portrayal of the German-led EU as its top adversary. If Putin cuts a deal over Ukraine by mid-summer as was argued here and here that he might, then this would likely be preceded by Russia shifting its threat perception of the US, which this move helps it do.

Speculation about that conflict aside, this reported decision aligns with the US’ “NATO 3.0” concept as Politico alluded to when writing that “The move is part of a wider American retrenchment from the NATO alliance — including canceled deployments of thousands of U.S. troops to Germany and plans to pull back certain assets — as the U.S. upends the close-knit partnerships that cemented the relationship for generations.” It also cited the head of US forces in Europe recently telling his hosts to “step up”.

The overarching trend is that a “cordon sanitaire” is being assembled around Russia in the Arctic-Baltic through UK-led efforts, Central Europe through Polish-led efforts, its entire southern periphery through Turkish-led efforts, and Northeast Asia through Japanese-led efforts. The US can therefore comfortably withdraw its forces from Europe to the absolute minimum required for maintaining “deterrence” seeing as how the containment noose around Russia has unprecedentedly tightened over the past year.

With Europe “under control” as the US sees it and West Asia on the way thereto pending the outcome of the Third Gulf War, particularly Trump’s demand that the rest of the Gulf Kingdoms join the Abraham Accords, the US can now focus more on Latin America and East Asia. Accordingly, it wouldn’t be surprising if more deployments to Europe are canceled and more troops withdrawn, which Russia would appreciate even though it doesn’t substantively alleviate the newfound pressure upon it as explained.