Thanks, McDodd. I still maintain despite what that other commentator claimed that it's more difficult to rely on pontoons for river crossings than on bridges and rails.
Right now there's an absolutely unimpeded flow of troops and equipment across the river and has been for the entire duration of this conflict.
Since Russia might not be able to track and target NATO equipment in Western Ukraine, blowing up the bridges would at least slow their deployment to the front.
I'm beginning to suspect that another "gentlemen's deal" might be the reason why Russia hasn't even tried.
We can only speculate what the terms are, but the US might have threatened Russia with something serious if that's the case.
Perhaps they said they'd authorize a conventional intervention into Western Ukraine, which while partitioning it, could spike the risk of WWIII which Putin wants to avoid?
I don't know, I'm just spitballing here because we know that it would help Russia and harm Ukraine if these bridges were destroyed (again, unlike what the other guy claimed).
So it would follow that the US might threaten something greater that would harm Russia and help Ukraine even more, such as a conventional intervention by NATO.
IтАЩve always been of the opinion that they WANT that flow. ItтАЩs a much broader attritional war in that theyтАЩre perfectly happy to kill all the mercenaries and empty every NATO armory. Neither can be replaced.
Everyone is also underestimating or outright ignoring the developmental aspect of this war. ItтАЩs a real world laboratory wherein Russia is refining every aspect of their military, fine tuning their industrial complex, and in due course steadily nullifying every weapon the West has.
By the time NATO would get around to committing themselves they wouldnтАЩt have any cards to play.
My personal opinion is that the "race of logistics"/"war of attrition" was an outcome of Russia being unable to wrap everything up quickly like it initially wanted to do, not a planned feature of the SMO.
As for why the bridges still aren't being destroyed, I plan to have a piece about that tomorrow or the next day, definitely by the end of the week. I've been thinking about it a lot and want to generate a discussion.
Absolutely, I was relieved to see that Russia -- which traditionally lacks flexibility and takes a long time to learn lessons -- adapted to changing circumstances a lot faster than I thought.
It could have been faster in hindsight, of course, but it was still better than what I think many expected. Everything's back on the right track though earlier opportunities that could have been tapped now appear forever lost.
The conflict is altogether different at this point than it was at the beginning. Whereas it might have been easier to destroy the bridges back then, now it's much harder and there might be less missiles comfortably available to expend.
After all, Ukraine has around 20 bridges over the Dnieper, and there's certainly some air defense guarding at least the main ones. I'm not so sure Russia has the excess missiles required for saturating 20 bridges simultaneously.
Yes, that's certainly true in one sense, on the surface, which tends to be about as far as most issues ever penetrate. In another sense, though, regarding matters of military necessity, when the gloves really come off, they seem flexible enough to scorch land and adaptable enough to rise afresh from the ashes. I think this is what the aggressors missed, or got wrong, in 1990-92, when they were deciding whether to expand NATO for 'full spectrum dominance', or work to find out how they could help and learn from the collapse of the USSR. Jeffery Sachs sheds some revealing light on this. (https://www.unz.com/article/how-the-neocons-chose-hegemony-over-peace-beginning-in-the-early-1990s/?utm_source=email&utm_campaign=daily)
I think this is because their wars, when the military needs to take its gloves off, are defensive тАФ their necessity is existential. I shall refrain from commenting on aggressors' wars.
"I'm not so sure Russia has the excess missiles required for saturating 20 bridges simultaneously."
There is, of course, the solution NATO would employ, the same as they used at Kakhova: blow up just one dam to make a flood of biblical proportion. I shan't comment on morality or military ethics here. I wonder how many bridges are downstream of the dam at the top of the Dnepr? There's a difference between scorching your own and someone else's land.
This is perhaps the most reliable indication of how the Russians REALLY regard the Ukraine as a viable state тАФ what is theirs and what is the Ukraine's тАФ and their respect for Ukrainian sovereignty: they won't scorch the Ukrainians' earth because it's not theirs to scorch (or flood). I shan't comment on the Americans' regard for whatever the hell was downstream of Kakhovka.
Agreed. The тАЬKiev GambitтАЭ was a chance to prevent all of this plus тАФ as many also conveniently forget тАФ a very successful тАЬpinningтАЭ of AFU forces that allowed them to clean house in Azovstal.
You're right, I wrote about it at the time at the now-defunct oneworld.press (you can find an Internet Archive version of my work there from February 2022-September 2022 when I fully moved to Substack once they closed down).
Basically, I still believe that it was a feint to divide Kiev's forces from the southern and eastern fronts so as to facilitate more advances there with a view towards building the "land bridge" (which was successful) while pressuring Zelensky to capitulate (which was unsuccessful).
I hadn't thought of the bridges like that, making it impossible to track troops and supplies.
Too many armchair generals, though; all joking aside, I wouldn't like to comment on the relative efficiency or inefficiency of any particular action. I don't know.
I do, however, trust Putin and the Russians to get it right.
I think you're wise to recognise spitballing, when ya gotta...
And I reckon you're most probably right about the gentlemen's agreement.
So frustrating to force oneself to reconcile to statesmen, like Putin, particularly in a world where there are so few of them, needing to relate to [find your own word here for Biden, Sullivan, UK PMs et alia, please] as 'gentlemen', when the world is so full of such [?].
On the other hand, it doesn't do too much/any harm?
Thanks, McDodd. I still maintain despite what that other commentator claimed that it's more difficult to rely on pontoons for river crossings than on bridges and rails.
Right now there's an absolutely unimpeded flow of troops and equipment across the river and has been for the entire duration of this conflict.
Since Russia might not be able to track and target NATO equipment in Western Ukraine, blowing up the bridges would at least slow their deployment to the front.
I'm beginning to suspect that another "gentlemen's deal" might be the reason why Russia hasn't even tried.
We can only speculate what the terms are, but the US might have threatened Russia with something serious if that's the case.
Perhaps they said they'd authorize a conventional intervention into Western Ukraine, which while partitioning it, could spike the risk of WWIII which Putin wants to avoid?
I don't know, I'm just spitballing here because we know that it would help Russia and harm Ukraine if these bridges were destroyed (again, unlike what the other guy claimed).
So it would follow that the US might threaten something greater that would harm Russia and help Ukraine even more, such as a conventional intervention by NATO.
IтАЩve always been of the opinion that they WANT that flow. ItтАЩs a much broader attritional war in that theyтАЩre perfectly happy to kill all the mercenaries and empty every NATO armory. Neither can be replaced.
Everyone is also underestimating or outright ignoring the developmental aspect of this war. ItтАЩs a real world laboratory wherein Russia is refining every aspect of their military, fine tuning their industrial complex, and in due course steadily nullifying every weapon the West has.
By the time NATO would get around to committing themselves they wouldnтАЩt have any cards to play.
Excellent points!
I do believe you, like Putin and the Russians, are quite right.
My personal opinion is that the "race of logistics"/"war of attrition" was an outcome of Russia being unable to wrap everything up quickly like it initially wanted to do, not a planned feature of the SMO.
As for why the bridges still aren't being destroyed, I plan to have a piece about that tomorrow or the next day, definitely by the end of the week. I've been thinking about it a lot and want to generate a discussion.
"...not a planned feature of the SMO."
No, it would be difficult to ignore that aspect of the SMO has not gone to plan.
Still, flexibility and adaptability being what they are, as important as they are, perhaps it's not such a bad thing (in the long run)?
"...the bridges still aren't being destroyed, I plan to have a piece about that..."
Ah-ha, I look forward to that.
Thanks for the heads-up!
Absolutely, I was relieved to see that Russia -- which traditionally lacks flexibility and takes a long time to learn lessons -- adapted to changing circumstances a lot faster than I thought.
It could have been faster in hindsight, of course, but it was still better than what I think many expected. Everything's back on the right track though earlier opportunities that could have been tapped now appear forever lost.
The conflict is altogether different at this point than it was at the beginning. Whereas it might have been easier to destroy the bridges back then, now it's much harder and there might be less missiles comfortably available to expend.
After all, Ukraine has around 20 bridges over the Dnieper, and there's certainly some air defense guarding at least the main ones. I'm not so sure Russia has the excess missiles required for saturating 20 bridges simultaneously.
"...traditionally lacks flexibility..."
Yes, that's certainly true in one sense, on the surface, which tends to be about as far as most issues ever penetrate. In another sense, though, regarding matters of military necessity, when the gloves really come off, they seem flexible enough to scorch land and adaptable enough to rise afresh from the ashes. I think this is what the aggressors missed, or got wrong, in 1990-92, when they were deciding whether to expand NATO for 'full spectrum dominance', or work to find out how they could help and learn from the collapse of the USSR. Jeffery Sachs sheds some revealing light on this. (https://www.unz.com/article/how-the-neocons-chose-hegemony-over-peace-beginning-in-the-early-1990s/?utm_source=email&utm_campaign=daily)
I think this is because their wars, when the military needs to take its gloves off, are defensive тАФ their necessity is existential. I shall refrain from commenting on aggressors' wars.
"I'm not so sure Russia has the excess missiles required for saturating 20 bridges simultaneously."
There is, of course, the solution NATO would employ, the same as they used at Kakhova: blow up just one dam to make a flood of biblical proportion. I shan't comment on morality or military ethics here. I wonder how many bridges are downstream of the dam at the top of the Dnepr? There's a difference between scorching your own and someone else's land.
This is perhaps the most reliable indication of how the Russians REALLY regard the Ukraine as a viable state тАФ what is theirs and what is the Ukraine's тАФ and their respect for Ukrainian sovereignty: they won't scorch the Ukrainians' earth because it's not theirs to scorch (or flood). I shan't comment on the Americans' regard for whatever the hell was downstream of Kakhovka.
Agreed. The тАЬKiev GambitтАЭ was a chance to prevent all of this plus тАФ as many also conveniently forget тАФ a very successful тАЬpinningтАЭ of AFU forces that allowed them to clean house in Azovstal.
You're right, I wrote about it at the time at the now-defunct oneworld.press (you can find an Internet Archive version of my work there from February 2022-September 2022 when I fully moved to Substack once they closed down).
Basically, I still believe that it was a feint to divide Kiev's forces from the southern and eastern fronts so as to facilitate more advances there with a view towards building the "land bridge" (which was successful) while pressuring Zelensky to capitulate (which was unsuccessful).
Yeah, makes good sense.
I hadn't thought of the bridges like that, making it impossible to track troops and supplies.
Too many armchair generals, though; all joking aside, I wouldn't like to comment on the relative efficiency or inefficiency of any particular action. I don't know.
I do, however, trust Putin and the Russians to get it right.
I think you're wise to recognise spitballing, when ya gotta...
And I reckon you're most probably right about the gentlemen's agreement.
So frustrating to force oneself to reconcile to statesmen, like Putin, particularly in a world where there are so few of them, needing to relate to [find your own word here for Biden, Sullivan, UK PMs et alia, please] as 'gentlemen', when the world is so full of such [?].